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Abstract Over the last decades, Latin American countries have experienced a noticeable
decrease in income inequality. While this trend is mainly associated with a decline in wage
inequality, progressive reforms of the tax-benefit systems of the region may have played a
role. While redistributive systems in Latin America are still in their infancy, they are con-
stantly expanding and do so at different pace in the region. To investigate this point in
a comparative way, the present study exploits newly developed tax-benefit microsimula-
tion models for Ecuador and Colombia. These two neighboring countries show contrasted
situations in terms of income distribution and we characterize the extent to which this
difference is explained by different tax-benefit systems. The comparative nature of our
microsimulation models allows us to swap tax-benefit systems between countries to produce
counterfactual simulations whereby the system of a country is applied to the population of
the other. In this way, we can decompose the total country difference in income distribution
to extract the role of different tax-benefit policies. We confirm that the Ecuadorean system is
more redistributive and quantify the difference: if the Ecuadorean system was applied to the
Colombian population, the Gini coefficient would be reduced by 1.7 points in Colombia.
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Headcount poverty would decrease by around 10% and the intensity of poverty by up to
14.7%. This analysis contributes to the recent literature on the redistributive role of tax-
benefit systems in Latin America and highlights the role of microsimulation techniques
to show how countries in the region can learn from each other in order to improve social
protection and reduce income inequality.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, Latin America has experienced an important decrease in household
income inequality (Lustig et al. 2013; Alvaredo and Gasparini 2015). Recent studies have
shown that the main driver must have been the reduction in wage inequality (Abad and
Lindert 2017; De la Torre et al. 2017). But, changes in tax-benefit systems, in the form
of more progressive income taxation and higher cash transfers to vulnerable populations,
have also played a role. According to Cord et al. (2014), around one-third of changes in
income inequality in Latin America in the 2000s can be attributed to the development of
redistributive systems. Despite these improvements, income inequality remains high in the
region and redistributive systems in Latin America are still in their infancy. Taxes represent
about 23% of GDP, compared to 34.3% in the OECD, and indirect taxes still play a major
role while progressive taxation is modest. Public pensions spending in Latin America is half
the size of the OECD, and direct transfers to the working age population (conditional cash
transfers in Latin America) represent only 0.4% of GDP compared to 4.2% in the OECD.1
The role played by the tax-benefit system varies widely across countries. The present
study provides a case study over two neighboring countries, Ecuador and Colombia, which
show very different profiles of income distribution.2 Ecuador is an interesting example of
one of the countries in the region that has achieved a large decrease in income inequality
and poverty over the recent years, partly thanks to the development of generous transfers to
the poorest part of the population. While having a similar economy,3 Colombia has experi-
enced a much smaller decrease in income inequality over time and developed a more modest
redistributive system. To put things in perspective, note that on average, tax-benefit systems
in Latin America decrease the Gini coefficient from 50.8 (market income) to 48.1 (dispos-
able income), according to Lustig (2017) for the year 2011.4 The two countries under study
present sharp contrasts around this regional average. According to our calculations for the
year 2014, Ecuador starts with lower inequality levels and provides more redistribution,
1Social spending remains below 15% of GDP, compared to more than 25% on average in OECD countries.
2The vast majority of distributional analyses in Latin America are based on household income rather than
consumption. This is due to the fact that most Latin American countries collect income information on a
regular basis in household surveys, whereas consumption data is collected only over long periods of time.
The concept of analysis is often market income augmented with cash transfers, i.e. information on tax and
social insurance contribution is not always available in the data. Microsimulation studies remedy partly to
this by simulating a broader concept of disposable income.
3Ecuador and Colombia are middle ranked countries in terms of GDP per capita. Both countries heavily
depend on primary resources revenue, in particular oil which represented around 50% of exports in 2014 in
both countries.
4In comparison, the Gini coefficient for the EU28 falls from 50.1 to 29.2% on average, when market
income is compared to disposable income (See EUROMOD statistics on Distribution and Decomposition of
Disposable Income, accessed at http://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/statistics).
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with a Gini falling from 50.1 to 46.2%. Colombia shows the opposite situation, with a Gini
falling from 59.2 to 56.4%.
Proper characterizations and comparisons of the redistributive potential of these coun-
tries require tools like microsimulation models that allow a comparative perspective. More
generally, the importance of building tax-benefit microsimulation models for developing
countries was highlighted by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1990), as such models should
“lead to a comprehensive, powerful and yet simple instrument for the design of an efficient
redistribution system adapted to the specificity of developing countries”.5 The need of
developing accessible and comparable tax-benefit models was also pointed out,6 even
though cases of such comparative settings still remain rare. The pioneering work by Atkin-
son et al. (1988), which used national tax-benefit models to compare policy effects in France
and the UK, inspired the development of the European microsimulation model EUROMOD,
which is probably the only example of a harmonized model allowing proper international
comparisons.
The present paper takes advantage of the recent development of such harmonized
microsimulation models for Ecuador and Colombia, ECUAMOD and COLMOD. On this
basis, we provide one of the first comparative microsimulation studies for Latin American
countries. These microsimulation models are based on rich representative household micro-
data for each country. They are developed as a multi-country microsimulation embedded in
the modeling structure of EUROMOD. This means that every redistributive instrument is
defined according to the same core calculation and definition, using similar data treatment
for source income and household characteristics, hence guaranteeing a harmonized frame-
work for international comparisons (see Sutherland and Figari 2013).7 Armed with this tool,
we assess the distributional effects of the Ecuadorean and Colombian tax-benefit systems
by “swapping” tax-benefit rules between the two countries. This approach consists in sim-
ulating a series of counterfactual scenarios whereby the tax-benefit rules of one country are
applied to the population of the other country. These counterfactual simulations are compo-
nents of a decomposition that allows disentangling and quantifying the impact of national
policy rules on income distribution.
Several microsimulation exercises in the literature have consisted in swapping particu-
lar policies from one country to another when using the European microsimulation model
EUROMOD, learning from how the effects of policies differ across different popula-
tions and economic circumstances. Examples of this kind of “policy learning” experiments
include swap simulations of unemployment benefit schemes in Belgium and the Nether-
lands (De Lathouwer 1996) or of child and family benefits in France and the UK (Atkinson
et al. 1988), Austria, Spain and the UK (Levy et al. 2007b) or Baltic and Eastern European
5Focusing on Brazil as a case study, they found that much of the redistribution in the existing Brazilian system
in the 1980’s relied on instruments that were less important in OECD countries. For example, indirect taxes,
subsidies and the provision of targeted non-cash benefits such as public education and subsidized school
meals were found to be more important. Instruments more important in OECD systems and often the main
instruments in tax-benefit models (personal income taxes, social insurance contributions and pensions), were
largely confined to the modern sector in Brazil and thus of less importance to policy makers. Nevertheless
they argued that sufficient data existed at the time to simulate many of the Brazilian specific instruments in
addition to the “classic” ones.
6 These recommendations have materialized in the production of national tax-benefit models for a few Latin
American countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay (Immervoll et al. 2009; Lo´pez-
Calva and Urzu´a 2011; Urzu´a 2012). However, such national models do not necessarily provide a harmonized
setting for cross-country comparative analysis.
7It is also the basis for a more generalized comparative tool for many more countries of the region, to be
developed in the next years.
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countries (Salanauskaite and Verbist 2013). The present study is the first to perform a
swap of the whole tax-benefit systems between two countries. In this way, it completes the
suggestion of Atkinson et al. (1988) that led to the development of EUROMOD. The decom-
position method used in this paper to isolate the redistributive role of tax-benefit systems
is inspired from earlier contributions (Bargain and Callan 2010; Bargain 2012). However,
instead of comparing the same country over two different periods in time, as in the latter,
we originally compare two different countries for the same policy year (see the discussion
of the general decomposition framework in Bargain 2012).
Our results confirm the small redistributive role of tax-benefit systems in Ecuador
and Colombia, based on policy rules of 2014. As expected, the Ecuadorean system
achieves a larger degree of redistribution than the Colombian system. Under the counter-
factual scenarios where the Colombian (Ecuadorean) tax-benefit system is applied to the
Ecuadorean (Colombian) population, the Gini coefficient in Ecuador (Colombia) would
increase (decrease) by 1.9 (1.7) points. Our decomposition shows that differences in tax-
benefit rules between Ecuador and Colombia account for 1.8 points of the total difference
in inequality, on average. Results are even more impressive in terms of income poverty. If
Colombia adopted the Ecuadorean system, headcount poverty would decline by around 10%
(3.4 points) while the intensity of poverty would be reduced by 14.7%. The effect is largest
for the elderly population in Colombia as headcount elderly poverty would fall by 18.7%.
This result relates to the more generous social assistance benefit in place in Ecuador, which
targets the elderly not covered by contributory pensions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents statistics on
tax-benefit systems in Latin America and the countries under studies. It also summarizes
previous research on the redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems in Latin America.
Section 3 describes the data, the microsimulation models and presents the decomposition
approach used in the analysis. Section 4 shows and discusses the results of our tax-benefit
swapping exercise. Section 5 concludes.
2 Tax-benefit systems and income redistribution in Latin America
This section provides a general overview of the characteristics of tax-benefit systems in
Latin America and their redistributive role, relative to developed economies. We start by
discussing how the size and composition of tax-benefit systems in Latin America compares
to those of OECD countries, and put into perspective the situation of Ecuador and Colombia.
We then summarize the recent literature on the redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems
in Latin America, with a particular focus on these countries.
2.1 Statistics in a comparative perspective
Latin America Relative to OECD countries, the size of the tax-benefit system remains
modest in Latin America, despite important improvements over the last decades. In terms
of taxes, the average tax-to-GDP ratio in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) increased
from 15.8% in 1990 to 22.8% in 2015 but it is still below the OECD average of 34.3%
(OECD/ECLAC/CIAT/IDB 2017). LAC countries are also characterized by a different tax
composition relative to developed economies. Mainly due to their ease of collection, indi-
rect taxes on goods and services remain very important, representing 49.1% of tax revenues
in LAC countries, broken down in 28.4% for VAT (compared to around 20% in the OECD)
and 20.7% for other indirect taxes. Other tax revenues in LAC countries came from the
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combination of taxes on income and profits (27.2%) and social security contributions
(16.4%) in 2015, compared to 33.7% and 26.2% respectively in the OECD. Out of all taxes,
the share of personal income tax in LAC countries is low compared to OECD economies.
In 2014, it represented 34.1% (against 65.9% for corporate income tax) of total income tax
revenue, compared to 73.2% (against 26.8%) in the OECD.
In terms of benefits, social spending has also increased, from 11.3% of GDP in 1990
to around 14% in 2014, but remains low compared to 21.1% in the OECD (cf. CEPAL
2004, OECD 2017). Nonetheless, non-contributory transfers are nowadays smaller but of a
similar magnitude as in richer countries. For instance, while public pensions represent 4.5%
of GDP in the LAC region compared to 8.2% in the OECD (Bernal 2016), non-contributory
pensions amount to an average of 0.45%, which is similar to that of a country like Spain
(the OECD average is 1.55%). Direct cash transfers to vulnerable population subgroups in
Latin America are mainly made of conditional cash transfers and represent around 0.4% of
GDP (CEPAL-IEF 2014), which is similar in size to the 0.5% of GDP expenditures in social
exclusion benefits in the EU-27 but below the transfers in some countries (for instance,
France spends 0.8% of GDP on welfare payment to working and idle poor).8
The modest size of tax-benefit systems in Latin American countries is reflected in their
small redistributive role. On average tax-benefit systems in Latin America reduce income
inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, by 2.7 points (from 50.8 to 48.1) when market
income is compared to disposable income in 2011 (Lustig 2017). The effect is particu-
larly small compared to European economies, where the tax-benefit system reduces income
inequality by around 20.9 points on average (from 50.1 to 29.2).9 One of the main issues
is the lack of targeting of non-contributory benefits, only half of it reaching the poor on
average (Robles et al. 2015).
Ecuador Ecuador is an interesting example of a country that has achieved a large decrease
in income inequality and poverty. According to data from the Socio-Economic Database
for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), the Gini coefficient of household income
per capita in Ecuador fell from 53.6% in 2004 to 45.2% in 2014.10 Over the same period,
Ecuador also experienced an important decrease in poverty, with the absolute poverty
headcount falling from 48.0% in 2004 to 23.6% in 2014.11
8Other types of benefits represent a larger share of direct transfers for the working-age population in the EU:
family benefits (2.4% of GDP), unemployment benefits (1.4% of GDP), housing benefits (0.6% of GDP). See
Eurostat social protection statistics: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=spr exp sum&
lang=en
9See EUROMOD statistics on Distribution and Decomposition of Disposable Income, accessed at http://
www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/statistics
10Note that differences between SEDLAC figures and our results are on account of the use of different
surveys in the analysis. SEDLAC statistics for Ecuador are based on the National Survey of Employment,
Underemployment and Unemployment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo). Statistics
for Colombia are based on the Integrated Household Survey (Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares). More-
over, SELDAC figures are based on the concept of market income augmented with cash transfers, i.e. taxes
and social insurance contributions are not deducted as in general no information is available in household
surveys. For more information see: http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/index.php.
11SEDLAC figures on poverty as well as those extracted from Lustig (2017) are obtained using a poverty
line of USD 4.00 PPP per day. Note that the 23.6% figure for 2014 seems still overstated compared to our
estimations (18%). As explained later, the differences are driven by (i) different datasets (the data we use
contains much more detailed income information than the yearly survey used by SEDLAC (see Jara et al.
2017, and confirmations by the national statistical institute), (ii) different income concepts (we use household
disposable income while SEDLAC uses market income plus cash transfers, as explained in footnote 12).
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Tax revenue in Ecuador is similar in size to the region average, with a tax-to-GDP ratio of
21% in 2014. The composition of tax revenue differs slightly. Indirect taxes represented 40%
of total tax revenue in 2014 (below the region average), income tax accounted for 23.1%
(personal income tax representing only 24% against 76% for corporate income tax) and
social insurance contributions accounted for 27.9%.12 In terms of benefits, non-contributory
(contributory) pensions account for around 0.3% (4%) of GDP. Ecuador presents one of the
highest levels of public spending in social assistance conditional cash transfers among Latin
American countries, amounting to 0.5% of GDP in 2014. In-kind benefits are similar to the
region average.
The tax-benefit system in Ecuador is more redistributive than average among LAC coun-
tries. According to our results the Gini coefficient decreases by 3.9 points (from 50.1 to
46.2) when market income is compared to disposable income in 2014, whereas absolute
poverty decreases by 3.6 points.
Colombia This country has experienced a much smaller decrease in income inequality
over time than its neighbor, with the Gini coefficient of household income per capita falling
from 56.0% in 2004 to 53.3% in 2014, according to SEDLAC. The decrease in poverty over
time has been impressive, yet not as pronounced as in Ecuador, with the absolute poverty
headcount falling from 49.4% in 2004 to 28.9% in 2014.
Tax revenue in Colombia is similar in size to Ecuador, with a tax-to-GDP ratio of 20.8%.
Indirect taxes represented 35.4% of total tax revenue in 2014, while social insurance con-
tributions accounted for 29.54%. Income tax is relatively larger in size for the region,
accounting for 32.28% of tax revenue in 2014. However, out of total income tax only 10%
corresponded to personal income tax with corporate tax accounting for a large 90% (DANE
2017a). In terms of benefits, only 0.1% of GDP is allocated to the non-contributory pension
program Colombia Mayor (while contributory pensions account for around 5% of GDP in
2014). Public spending in social assistance transfers (including non-contributory pensions)
represented 0.3% of GDP.13
According to our results, the redistributive role of the tax-benefit system in Colombia is
smaller compared to Ecuador, with the Gini coefficient falling by 2.8 points (from 59.2 to
56.4) when market income is compared to disposable, and absolute poverty falling by 3.5
points. Note that this characterization, as much as our own calculations in what follows,
focuses on cash transfer while in-kind benefits are beyond its scope.14
2.2 Related literature
Despite the little progressivity characterizing tax-benefit systems in Latin America, their
redistributive role has grown over the past two decades, notably with the introduction
of conditional cash transfers targeting low income families (Abad and Lindert 2017;
12 Revenue statistics are available from the Internal Revenues Service (Servicio de Rentas Internas) at:
http://www.sri.gob.ec/web/guest/estadisticas-generales-de-recaudacion regarding taxes, from IESS (2014)
regarding social insurance contributions, from Jara et al. (2017) regarding personal income tax.
13Figures are based on a report of the Ministry of Labor to the Colombian Congress, available at: www.min-
trabajo.gov.co/documents/20147/266052/Informe+al+Congreso+de+actividades+del+Sector+Trabajo+2014-
2015.pdf; and management report of the Department of Social Prosperity, available at: http://www.prosperi-
dadsocial.gov.co/ent/gen/trs/Documents/Informe%20Gesti%C3%B3n%20DPS%20-%202014.pdf
14Public expenditure in education (health) represents 4.6% (4%) of GDP in LAC compared to 5.3% (6.2%)
in the OECD (cf. OECD 2017). Ecuador is close to the average with 4.7% (4%) in 2014 (cf data from the
General State Budget, available at: http://www.finanzas.gob.ec/ejecucion-presupuestaria/). So is Colombia,
with 4.6% (4.9%) in 2014 (DANE 2017b).
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De la Torre et al. 2017). According to Cord et al. (2014), around one-third of changes in
income inequality in Latin America in the 2000s can be attributed to the redistributive role
of tax-benefit systems. Back in the early 2000s, tax-benefit systems in Latin America oper-
ated only a very small redistributive effect, as shown by Gon˜i et al. (2011) using World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) enhanced with information about the inci-
dence of taxes and transfers from other studies. They show that on average direct taxes and
cash transfers in European countries decrease Gini by around 15 points (from 46.0 to 31.0)
versus only 2 points only (from 52.0 to 50.0) on average in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Mexico and Peru. They highlight a minor role of tax, which is attributed to low tax
collection due to evasion as well as high exemptions and deductions; in case in-kind ben-
efits are considered, Latin American tax-benefit systems achieve a larger redistribution (5
point decrease in Gini), but still much less than in European countries (21 point decrease).
The results are in line with findings by Barreix et al. (2006), who use household survey data
from the early 2000s for Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
For the more recent period, CEPAL-IEF (2014) study 17 Latin American countries using
household surveys from 2012 with imputed information for direct taxes and in-kind bene-
fits. Compared to the early 2000s, most Latin American countries experienced a decrease
in income inequality and the role of the tax-benefit system also increased, with a Gini
reduction of 9 points on average (from 51.0 to 42.0) including 6 points solely due to in-
kind benefits. Colombia is among the countries achieving the least redistribution (especially
when in-kind benefits are not considered) whereas Ecuador is close to the region aver-
age. The Commitment to Equity (CEQ) Institute has also suggested a common imputation
methodology for most Latin American countries around the year 2010, with the aim of
studying the incidence of taxes and benefits. The main difference between the imputation
approach and microsimulation techniques is that the latter systematically apply legislation
rules for the simulation of tax-benefit instruments – and hence allows simulating counter-
factual systems as in our ‘policy swaps’ – provided that information for the simulations is
available in the data (for instance, earnings, capital income, relevant demographics, etc.).
The imputation approach directly uses the information on taxes and transfers available from
the data while it imputes the rest from other sources.15 Using this approach, Lustig (2017)
confirms the best performances of country like Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil while Colom-
bia is among the countries redistributing the least. Ecuador ranks 5th (out 16 countries) in
terms of redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system. The results further highlight that
countries with similar levels of market income inequality (for instance Brazil, Honduras
and Colombia) achieve different levels of redistribution. In terms of income poverty, direct
taxes and benefits reduce extreme poverty in 12 out of the 16 countries analyzed, however
to very different extents. The effect of tax-benefits policies on poverty reduction is about
twice larger in Ecuador than in Colombia.
Finally, only few microsimulation studies exist for Latin America. Tax-benefit microsim-
ulation models were developed for Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay and used
in Lo´pez-Calva and Urzu´a (2011) based on household survey data for 2008-2009. Urzu´a
(2012) compiles a number of national studies making use of the models, but does not provide
a comparative analysis of the redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems across countries.
Despite the advantages offered by microsimulation techniques to assess the redistributive effect
15In Ecuador, the survey data used for the analysis, Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gatos Urbanos y Rurales,
ENIGHUR 2011-2012, records information on direct taxes and social insurance contributions, so these are
taken directly from the data (Llellena et al. 2015).
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of tax-benefit systems, very little use has been given to such models for cross-country com-
parative analysis in Latin America. One possible reason for this might be an underlying lack of
comparability in the implementation of policy simulations across national tax-benefit models.
3 Methodology
We start this section by presenting the data used and the microsimulation models. We
describe the tax-benefit policies covered by our models and discuss how our simula-
tions compare to external statistics in terms of the number of recipients and payers as
well as of aggregate annual amounts of simulated benefits and taxes. Then, we provide a
detailed description of the decomposition approach used to evaluate the effect of swapping
tax-benefit systems between Ecuador and Colombia.
3.1 Data and simulations
Data Our results are based on representative household survey data from Ecuador and
Colombia. Data from Ecuador comes from the National Survey of Income and Expendi-
tures of Urban and Rural Households (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de Hogares
Urbanos y Rurales, ENIGHUR) 2011-2012. Data from Colombia comes from the Quality
of Life National Survey for 2014 (Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Vida, ENCV). Both sur-
veys contain detailed information on household and personal characteristics, employment,
earnings, income from capital and property, private transfers, income from remittances,
cash transfers, pensions, and expenditures. Income concepts have been harmonized in both
datasets with the aim to achieve comparability in the simulation results (see Jara et al.
2017 and Rodriguez 2017). The sample for our simulations contains 153,341 individuals
for Ecuador and 67,332 individuals for Colombia.
Tax-benefit simulations Our study makes use of the newly developed tax-benefit
microsimulation models ECUAMOD and COLMOD.16 ECUAMOD and COLMOD com-
bine detailed country-specific coded policy rules with cross-sectional micro-data in order
to simulate direct taxes and social insurance contributions, as well as cash transfers for the
household population of Ecuador and Colombia. The models have been implemented on
the EUROMOD software, which enables users to analyze the effect of tax-benefit policies
on the income distribution in a comparable manner across countries. Both, ECUAMOD and
COLMOD, are static models in the sense that tax-benefit simulations abstract from behav-
ioral reactions of individuals and no adjustments are made for changes in the population
composition over time.
Our analysis takes 2014 policies (as on June 30th) in Ecuador and Colombia as the
starting point. In the case of Ecuador, market incomes and non-simulated tax-benefit vari-
ables in the 2011-12 data are adjusted to 2014 levels using source-specific updating factors
(Jara et al. 2017). Table 1 provides a summary of the tax-benefit instruments simulated in
ECUAMOD and COLMOD for the purpose of our exercise.
16ECUAMOD has been developed as part of UNU-WIDER’s project on ‘SOUTHMOD—simulating tax
and benefit policies for development’ in which tax–benefit microsimulation models have being built for
selected developing countries. Simulation results for ECUAMOD have been validated both at the micro and
macro level (see Jara et al. 2017). For more information about SOUTHMOD see: https://www.wider.unu.
edu/project/southmod-simulating-tax-and-benefit-policies-development.
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Table 1 Tax-benefit instruments simulated in Ecuador and Colombia (2014)
Ecuador Colombia
Employee social insurance contributions
• All employees are liable to pay SICs • All employees are liable to pay SICs
• Contribution base is gross employment income • Contribution base is gross employment income
• Total contribution rate is either 9.45 or 11.45% • Total contribution rate is between 8 and 10%
depending on the category of the worker depending on employment income
• No SICs are paid if income below 340 USD • Min. contribution: 8% of a minimum wage.
Max. contribution: 12% of 25 minimum wages
Self-employed social insurance contributions
• Self-employed workers can contribute to SICs • All self-employed are liable to pay SICs
on a voluntary basis • Contribution base is 40% of gross
• Contribution base is declared gross self-employment income
self-employment income • Total contribution rate is between 8 and 10%
• Total contribution rate is 20.50% depending on income
• No SICs are paid if income below 340 USD • Min. contribution: 8% of a minimum wage.
Max. contribution: 12% of 25 minimum wages
Personal income tax
• Tax unit is the individual • Tax unit is the individual
• Taxable income is gross labor income plus extra • Taxable income is labor income, extra pay,
pay plus utilities participation plus SICs pension income and income from assets
• Exemptions include income from pensions, 13th • Exemptions include income from company
and 14th months, reserve funds, and deductions ownership, taxed as business tax; depending
for old age and disability on the system up to 25% of labor income
• Deductions include SICs and deductions from • Deductions include expenditure in education,
personal expenditures in food, clothing, education, health and mortgage payments
health, and housing • Tax base is taxable income minus exemptions,
• Tax base is taxable income minus exemptions, minus deductions
minus deductions • Tax schedule is formed of different bands
• Tax schedule is formed of nine bands and rates contingent on the system applied, rates are
from 0 and 35% between 0 and 33%
Social Assistance benefits
Human Development Transfer Familias en accio´n
• Proxy means-tested benefit based on the • Proxy means-tested benefit based on a
composite index of the Social Registry composite welfare index (SISBEN)
• Eligible are: (i) poor families with children below • Eligible are: families with children below 18
18 years; (ii) vulnerable elderly not affiliated with • Amount: (i) health component:
social security, not receiving pensions; and (iii) 33-38 USD per month per family;
vulnerable persons with 40% or higher degree of (ii) education component:
disability, not affiliated with social security 11-24 USD per month per child for up
• Amount: 50 USD per month to 3 children
• Conditionality for children: school enrolment • Conditionality for children: school enrolment
and attendance, and medical check-ups and attendance, and medical check-ups
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Table 1 (continued)
Ecuador Colombia
Joaquı´n Gallegos Lara Transfer Colombia mayor
• Benefit for persons caring for individuals • Proxy means-tested benefit based on a
with severe disability and/or illness composite welfare index (SISBEN)
• Amount 240 USD per month • Eligible are: elderly older aged 54 years (female)
and 58 years (male) or more; no pension income
• Amount: Between USD 21 and USD 59 per month
depending on city/town
Notes: SIC – social insurance contributions; USD – US dollars. Exchange rate for 30th June 2014
Source: authors’ compilation
In both countries, employee and self-employed social insurance contributions are sim-
ulated in our models. Some important differences in the design of SICs between Ecuador
and Colombia can be highlighted. First, all self-employed workers are liable to pay SICs
in Colombia, whereas payment is voluntary for this group in Ecuador. Second, the contri-
bution base for the self-employed corresponds to the totality of self-employment income in
Ecuador, whereas only 40% of it is considered in Colombia. Contribution rates in Ecuador
vary depending on the sector of work, whereas they vary depending on income in Colom-
bia. Finally, an important difference refers to the exemption of SIC payments for incomes
below the minimum wage in Ecuador (USD 340 in 2014), whereas a minimum SIC payment
equivalent to 8% of minimum wage is compulsory in Colombia. Note that both ENIGHUR
2011-2012 and ECV 2014 contain information about affiliation to social security for each
individual in the data. Our models simulate SIC payments only for those individuals, who
report affiliation to the social security system in the survey.
Income tax has become increasingly important as a source of government revenue in
Ecuador and Colombia. The design of personal income tax varies between these countries
but it also presents some interesting similarities. In particular, in both countries, personal
income tax is characterized by the presence of deductions from personal expenditures in
education, health, housing, and in the case of Ecuador also expenditures in food and cloth-
ing. The small redistributive role of income tax in Latin American countries is usually
attributed to the presence of such deductions. Furthermore, the structure of personal income
tax in Colombia is more complex than in Ecuador. In addition to the standard tax regime
another two alternative regimes were introduced in 2012 in order to prevent the excessive
use of deductions.17 In both, ECUAMOD and COLMOD, personal income tax is simulated
under the assumption of full compliance. Simulation of some sort of tax evasion would
necessarily require strong assumptions about who is evading tax. Assuming, for instance,
that only individuals affiliated with social security pay income tax would underestimate
income tax payment of the self-employed, who can opt for affiliation on a voluntary basis
in Ecuador but who are still liable to pay income tax. Our results for income tax, therefore,
represent the intended effect of the tax system. As we shall see, even under the assumption
of full compliance, the redistributive effect of income tax in Ecuador and Colombia is small,
as previously found in the literature.
17The alternative tax regimes were abolished in the tax reform of 2016, as they were deemed too complex.
For a detailed description of the personal income tax rules in Colombia, see Rodriguez (2017).
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In terms of social assistance, our models simulate the main cash transfers available in
Ecuador and Colombia. The Human Development Transfer (HDT) in Ecuador and Familias
en accio´n in Colombia are proxy means-tested conditional cash transfers. These programs
have an important impact on poverty alleviation as they are targeted to low income fami-
lies. In Ecuador, the HDT represents 0.8% of GDP, whereas Familias en accio´n represents
0.3% of GDP. In both countries, the proxy means-test is based on composite welfare indices.
The indices are based on a series of variables containing information on household charac-
teristics, household head’s characteristics, housing, living conditions, assets, and territory,
among others. For both Ecuador and Colombia, we are able to replicate the composite
indices for each household in the data in order to simulate eligibility for social assistance.18
In both countries, families with children ranking low according to the composite indices are
eligible for social assistance, as long as the conditionality of school enrolment and med-
ical check-ups is fulfilled. In Ecuador the HDT also targets old-age individuals, who are
not affiliated with social security and not receiving pensions. In Colombia, the correspon-
dent social benefit for the elderly is Colombia Mayor. Such schemes represent a type of
non-contributory pension, aimed at protecting vulnerable elderly population not covered by
social security, which we simulate as part of social assistance in our models. Finally, another
population group eligible for HDT are persons with severe disabilities. Additionally, a dis-
ability carer benefit, the Joaquin Gallegos Lara transfer, is also part of social assistance in
Ecuador and aims to improve living conditions of people with severe disability by providing
a monthly payment to their carers.
Scope of the simulations Our analysis focuses on the concept of disposable income, that
is, market income after income tax and SICs deductions and after receipt of cash benefits.
Indirect taxes and in-kind benefits are not considered but the implications of including them
in the analysis are discussed in our conclusions. ECUAMOD and COLMOD simulations
cover the most important direct taxes and cash transfers present in Ecuador and Colombia.
Table 2 provides a list of all income components used in our simulation models. Due to
data limitations, some tax-benefit instruments cannot be simulated and are taken directly
from the data. Therefore, the effect of these policies when applied to the other country in
our counterfactuals cannot be assessed. This includes contributory public pensions and sev-
erance payments, which cannot be simulated given the lack of information on contribution
records in the surveys, most disability benefits (which are then partially simulated) because
of insufficient information on the degree of disability, and property taxes and motor vehi-
cle taxes due to the absence of information about property and vehicles value in the data.
In Ecuador, the housing grant cannot be simulated due to lack of information about the
price of the property individuals intend to buy nor about the cost of planned remodeling
for their current house; scholarships cannot be simulated because no information about stu-
dents’ grades to determine eligibility for scholarships is available in the data. In Colombia,
displacement/emergency benefit cannot be simulated because of its contingent nature not
captured in the survey. With the exception of contributory pensions, all other non-simulated
instruments represent a minor part of tax-benefit systems in Ecuador and Colombia.
Validation Tables A1 and A2 in the Online appendix compare the number of recipients
and payers, and aggregate annual amounts of simulated benefits and taxes obtained with
18 We are grateful to the National Department of Planning (DNP) of Colombia for computing the SISBEN
indices for our dataset.
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Table 2 Simulated and non-simulated income components in ECUAMOD and COLMOD
Income component Treatment in Treatment in Why not fully simulated?
ECUAMOD COLMOD
Market income Taken from Taken from −
the data the data
Simulated tax-benefit instruments:
Employee SICs Simulated Simulated −
Self-employed SICs Simulated Simulated −
Personal income tax Simulated Simulated −
Human development Simulated − −
transfer (HDT)
Joaquı´n Gallegos Lara Partially
simulated
− Eligibility for the benefit cannot
be simulated to lack of
information about severity of
disability in the data
Familias en accio´n − Simulated −
Colombia Mayor − Simulated −
Forced displacement and
humanitarian relief benefit
− Partially
simulated
Eligibility for the benefit cannot
be simulated due to the
contingent nature of the benefit
Non-simulated tax-benefit instruments:
Contributory public pensions
and severance payments
Taken from
the data
Taken from
the data
No data on contribution records
Scholarships Taken from
the data
− No information about students’
grades to determine eligibility
for scholarships
Housing grant Taken from
the data
− No information about the price
of the property individuals
intend to buy nor about the
cost of planned remodeling
for their current house
Property tax Taken from
the data
Taken from
the data
No information on property
values in the data
Wealth tax Taken from
the data
− No detailed information on
wealth in the data
Motor vehicle tax Taken from
the data
Taken from
the data
No information on vehicle values
in the data
Notes: Market income is the sum of employment and self-employment income, bonuses, in-kind income,
auto-consumption from self-employment activities, capital and property income, inter-household payments,
private transfers, minus alimony payments. Imputed rent is not included as part of market income.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
ECUAMOD and COLMOD to those of external benchmarks (see detailed discussions in
Jara et al. 2017 and Rodriguez 2017). We observe that simulations somewhat underesti-
mate the number and aggregate amount of SIC payments. For Ecuador, the underestimation
is important for self-employment SICs, which might be related to difficulties of captur-
ing self-employment income in the survey. As for income tax, we also underestimate the
number of payers and aggregate annual amounts in Ecuador and Colombia, even under the
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assumption of zero evasion. Yet, importantly for distributional analyzes, Cuesta and Jara
(2017) show that the distribution of income tax payers by amount of income tax obtained
using ECUAMOD simulations capture quite well the distribution of income tax payers
according to administrative data. Regarding benefits, ECUAMOD captures very well the
number of recipients of the HDT but underestimates the annual expenditure in this bene-
fit. This might be related to additional costs added to the expenditures in HDT payments in
external statistics. On the other hand, the Joaquı´n Gallegos Lara is underestimated, which is
due to the fact that the survey does not properly capture recipients of this benefit, as eligibil-
ity in our simulation is based on receipt in the data. For Colombia, the number of recipients
of Familias en accio´n and Colombia Mayor is somewhat underestimated; however, the
annual aggregate amounts of Colombia Mayor match external statistics well.
Tables A3 and A4 in the Online appendix present a comparison of poverty and inequal-
ity results from ECUAMOD and COLMOD, with those obtained directly from ENIGHUR
and ECV, and with respect to official statistics. Poverty and inequality estimated with
ECUAMOD and COLMOD only slightly underestimate those obtained from ENIGHUR
and ECV data. The underestimation is more important with respect to official statistics.
The reason behind the discrepancies is that official statistics are based on different sur-
veys than those used in our models. In particular, for Ecuador, the National Survey of
Employment, Underemployment and Unemployment (ENEMDU) is used to produce offi-
cial estimates of income poverty and inequality. The discrepancy is mainly driven by the fact
that ENIGHUR, on which ECUAMOD input data are based, contains much more detailed
income information than ENEMDU (Jara et al. 2017).
3.2 Decomposition
This section draws on the methodology described by Bargain (2012) applied to the context
of swapping tax-benefit systems between two countries. We first introduce some nota-
tion and terminology. By household ‘gross income’ or ‘market income’, we mean the total
amount of labor income, capital income and private pensions, before taxes and benefits (the
treatment of replacement incomes and contributory benefits is detailed below). ‘Disposable
income’ is the household income that remains after payment of taxes/social contributions
and receipt of all cash transfers, as widely used to measure poverty and inequality. Let
matrix yc describe the population contained in the data of country c, i.e., each row contains
all the information about a given household (various market income sources and socio-
demographic characteristics). Let dc denote the ‘tax-benefit function’ transforming, for each
household, market/gross incomes and household characteristics into a certain level of dis-
posable income. Tax-benefit calculations depend also on a set of monetary parameters pc
(maximum benefit amounts, threshold level of tax brackets, etc.). Household disposable
income is represented by di(pj , yk) for a hypothetical scenario including the population of
country k, the tax-benefit parameters of country j and the tax-benefit structure of country i.
A welfare index, such as a measure of inequality or poverty, can be calculated on the basis
of the distribution of disposable income and is denoted I [dc (pc, yc)]
Policy differences between two countries combine differences in policy structure d and
in parameters p (for instance, they may have the same income tax system but different tax
band levels). As the policies of a given country are specific to its income distribution, and
notably to the overall income level, we also consider the possibility of nominally adjusting
incomes by an uprating factor α That is, differences in income levels between country 1
and country 2 can be adjusted by using the indexation factor α defined as the mean income
of country 2 divided by mean income of country 1. As a result, αy1 retains the structural
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characteristics of country 1 (demographics, market income distribution, etc.) but adopt the
mean income level prevailing in country 2. Hence, we can represent counterfactual distribu-
tions as d2(p2, αy1), the distribution of disposable incomes obtained by applying tax-benefit
rules and parameters of country 2 on nominally adjusted data of country 1. This backdrop is
used in the decompositions that follow and so is the symmetrical situation where we evalu-
ate the distribution obtained with the policy system of country 1 applied to the population of
country 2. Yet the latter is written d1(αp1y2), whereby tax-benefit parameters are nominally
adjusted to country 2’s levels using the same factor α.
The total difference  in the welfare indicator I between country 1 and country 2 can be
represented by:
 = I [d2 (p2, y2)] − I [d1 (p1, y1)] (1)
The difference in the distribution of disposable income, as summarized by index I , can
be decomposed into the contribution of the change in the tax-benefit rules (‘policy effect’)
and the contribution of changes in the underlying gross income distribution (or any other
effects not directly linked to policy changes). The former effect corresponds to a shift from
d1 (p1, .) to d2 (p2, .) while the latter corresponds to the move from data of country 1 to
data of country 2.
Two alternative decompositions can then be represented. The first type (decomposition
I) consists of a shift from country 1 data to country 2 data conditional on the policy rules of
country 1, followed by a move from policy of country 1 to policy of country 2 on country 2
data. Formally, this can be represented as:
 = {I [d2 (p2, y2)] − I [d1 (αp1, y2)]}(policy differences/gap)
+{I [d1(αp1, y2)] − I [d1(αp1, αy1)]}(other differences)
+{I [d1(αp1, αy1)] − I [d1(p1, y1)]} (income differences).
The second type of decomposition (decomposition II) involves a change in policy (from 1
to 2) evaluated on the basis of (nominally adjusted) country 1 data, followed by a change in
underlying data (from 1 to 2) conditional on the policy of country 2.
 = {I [d2(p2, y2)] − I [d1(p2, αy1)]}(other differences)
+{I [d2(p2, αy1)] − I [d1(αp1, αy1)]}(policy differences/gap)
+{I [d1(αp1, αy1)] − I [d1(p1, y1)]} (income differences).
In the case the tax-benefit function dc(pc, yc) is linearly homogenous in pc and yc, a simul-
taneous change in nominal levels of both incomes and parameters – be it from a shift of
currency or an application of factor α - should not affect the relative location of households
in the distribution of disposable income. Hence, the third component (“income differences”)
of equations (I) and (II) should disappear.
As explained by Shorrocks (2013), the Shapley value procedure extracts the marginal
effect on a poverty/inequality statistic I of eliminating each of the contributory factors in
sequence, and then assigns to each factor the average of its marginal contributions in all
possible elimination sequences. In the present case, if the homogeneity property is verified,
the ‘policy gap’ and the ‘other gaps’ under the Shapley decomposition are thus obtained
by averaging the contributions from the two decompositions set out above. Hence, it is
possible to quantify the relative weight of the policy gap in explaining country differences
in poverty/inequality. It is also possible to examine the sensitivity of the results to the choice
of the decomposition (I, II or or the averaged Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition).
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4 Empirical results
This section presents the results of our comparative assessment of the redistributive role of
tax-benefit systems in Ecuador and Colombia for the policy year 2014. We first discuss the
relative size of tax-benefit instruments in each country. Then, we present the main results
of our decomposition exercise to disentangle the role of tax-benefit policies in explaining
differences in income poverty and inequality between countries. Finally, we discuss the
contribution of particular policy instruments in reducing poverty and inequality.
4.1 Relative size of tax-benefit components
The relative size of four tax-benefit instruments by household disposable income decile
is presented in Fig. 1 for Ecuador and Colombia. The average size of each component is
measured as a percentage of average household disposable income per income decile. Taxes
and social insurance contributions are shown as negative values as they represent deductions
from disposable income.
Our results show the extent to which social assistance succeeds in targeting groups at
the lower end of the income distribution in both countries. Social assistance benefits repre-
sent on average 17% of household disposable income for individuals in the bottom decile in
Ecuador and 26% in Colombia. The proportion of household disposable income represented
by social assistance decreases with income levels. On the contrary, contributory public pen-
sions are regressive with respect to disposable income in both countries, and particularly
so in Colombia. The relative size of public pensions increases with household disposable
income and represents around 14% of household disposable income for the top decile in
Colombia, and around 5% in Ecuador. This pattern might be related to the fact that many
low income individuals are not affiliated to social security and would therefore not be enti-
tled to public pensions. As previously mentioned, public pensions are not simulated in our
models due to lack of information about contribution records to social security in the data.
Differences in the design of pensions between Ecuador and Colombia would not be captured
as part of the ‘policy effect’ in our decomposition analysis but would enter as part of the
differences in market income distribution.
Fig. 1 Tax-benefit components as a share of household disposable income (2014) Source: ECUAMOD
version 1.0 and COLMOD version 1.0
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Table 3 Effect of tax-benefit systems on income inequality and poverty (2014)
Inequality Poverty
(Gini coefficient %) (FGT0 %)
Disposable Market Difference Disposable Market Difference
income income income income
Ecuador 46.2 50.1 − 3.9 18.0 21.6 − 3.6
Colombia 56.4 59.2 − 2.8 36.3 39.8 − 3.5
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.0 and COLMOD version 1.0
Social insurance contributions are clearly progressive with respect to disposable income
in Ecuador and represent around 8.8% for the top income decile. In Colombia, SICs increase
with disposable income but at a lower rate, and the presence of SIC payments in the bot-
tom decile group is explained by the existence of a floor on SIC payments. As mentioned in
the previous section, the data used in our analysis allows us to identify individuals who are
affiliated to social security. SIC payments are simulated only for those affiliated to social
security in Ecuador and Colombia under the baseline and counterfactual scenarios presented
in the next section. In both countries, personal income tax plays a minor role and is notice-
able only for the top income decile group, representing around 5% of disposable income
in Ecuador and 4% in Colombia. This minor role is related to the presence of deductions
from personal expenditures, applied to taxable income. As previously mentioned, personal
income tax is simulated under the assumption of zero evasion in our analysis because of the
difficulties of accounting for some sort of non-compliance in a comparable way for both
countries. As we observe, even under the assumption of zero evasion, income tax plays a
minor role affecting only the top decile of the income distribution.
The effect of the tax-benefit system on income inequality and poverty in Ecuador and
Colombia in 2014 is presented in Table 3. The table compares results for the Gini coefficient
and poverty headcount of household disposable income and household market income per
capita.19 Absolute poverty is measured using a poverty line of USD 4.00 PPP per day, as
for previous studies for Latin American countries. Our results are in line with previous
findings in the literature. First, market income inequality and poverty are much higher in
Colombia than in Ecuador, with the Gini coefficient for market income equal to 59.2 in
Colombia compared to 50.1 in Ecuador, and market income poverty equal to 39.8% in
Colombia and 21.6% in Ecuador. Second, the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system
in Ecuador is larger than in Colombia. Taxes and benefits reduce the Gini coefficient by
3.9 points in Ecuador compared to 2.7 points in Colombia. Finally, the tax-benefit system
in Ecuador and Colombia have a similar effect on absolute poverty, with poverty falling by
3.6 points in Ecuador and 3.5 points in Colombia, when disposable income is compared to
market income. The next section provides the results of our decomposition analysis in order
to quantify the contribution of tax-benefit policies to differences in income inequality and
poverty between countries.
19Most Latin American countries use household income per capita, i.e. household income divided by the
number of persons in the household, for the measurement of income inequality and poverty.
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4.2 Decomposition results
The results of our decomposition analysis are presented in Table 4, which shows the differ-
ent counterfactuals used in the decomposition, the overall difference in inequality/poverty
between Ecuador and Colombia, the homogeneity check, and the results for decompositions
I, II and the averaged Shapley decomposition. We present a series of inequality and poverty
indicators to analyze in detail and for different population subgroups (e.g. children and the
elderly) the effect of swapping tax-benefit systems between countries. These income distri-
bution measures are again based on household disposable income per capita while absolute
poverty is measured using a poverty line of USD 4.00 PPP per day.
Decomposition components First, we compare the baseline scenarios for Ecuador and
Colombia which are reported in the columns indexed (0) and (4), respectively. These include
results of Table 3 for the Gini and the FGT0. In particular, the Gini is much lower in
Ecuador, i.e. 46.2% against 56.4% in Colombia, making up for a difference of 10.2 points
as indicated in the ‘Total difference’ column. Additional inequality indicators, such as the
Atkinson index and the P90/P10, confirm these results. Not only the overall poverty head-
count (FGT0) is higher in Colombia, this is also the case for families with children and the
elderly, as well as in terms of poverty gap (FGT1) and poverty severity (FGT2).
We can check whether the homogeneity property is respected. The column named
‘Homogeneity check’ shows the difference between the baseline scenario for Ecuador in
column (0) and a counterfactual scenario in column (1), where the Ecuadorean tax-benefit
system is applied to Ecuadorean data with all monetary variables adjusted by differences
in incomes between Ecuador and Colombia (captured by the parameter α in the equations
above). The difference between the baseline scenario (0) and the counterfactual (1) is equal
to zero for all measures in the table, confirming that homogeneity holds. As previously men-
tioned, if the homogeneity property is respected, as it is the case here, then the third term of
decompositions (I) and (II) disappears.
Two additional counterfactual scenarios are presented in Table 4 to perform our decom-
position. On the one hand, column (2) represents a scenario where the Ecuadorean
tax-benefit system has been applied to Colombian data. For instance, the Gini coefficient
for the Colombian population if the Ecuadorean tax-benefit system was in place would be
equal to 54.7%, which is lower than the baseline Gini coefficient for Colombia of 56.4%
(column 4). On the other hand, column (3) represents a counterfactual scenario whereby the
Colombian tax-benefit system has been applied to the Ecuadorean population, leading to a
Gini coefficient of 48.2% in Ecuador, slightly larger than the actual one (46.2%, as reported
in column 0).
Decomposition results The last 6 columns present the decomposition results under
decomposition (I), (II) and the averaged Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition. As explained,
the total effect is decomposed between the tax-benefit policy effect and the ‘other effect’.
The latter includes all the factors not related to tax-benefit policies as simulated in our
exercises, and notably differences in market income inequality and in demographics. The
policy effect is calculated as moving from the Colombian to the Ecuadorian system when
using either Colombian data (decomposition I) or Ecuadorian data (decomposition II). Both
decompositions give similar orders of magnitude for most inequality and poverty indices,
which show that the results are not too sensitive to the underlying population used for the
decomposition. The Shorrocks-Shapley average values give a useful summary in this context.
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Bear in mind that differences in non-simulated tax-benefit components, such as con-
tributory pensions, are captured as part of the ‘other effect’: the policy effect only
captures differences in social assistance benefits, personal income tax and social insurance
contributions between Ecuador and Colombia.
As expected, both decomposition results (I) and (II) show that most of the difference
in inequality and poverty between Ecuador and Colombia is driven by the ‘other effect’.
Nonetheless, we find that tax-benefit policy differences are not negligible. According to the
averaged Shorrocks-Shapley, the policy effect explains between 17.6% and 23.1% of the
income inequality difference between countries depending on the inequality measure at use.
For instance, a difference of 1.8 point is observed for the Gini, meaning that the difference
in inequality between the countries, as measured by the Gini, would fall by 17.6% if the
Ecuadorian system was used in Colombia.
The policy effect also explains up to 16.4% of the difference in poverty headcount (3
percentage points) and 18.5% of the difference in poverty intensity (2 points). This contri-
bution is similar in the case of child poverty (2.9 and 1.9 points respectively), yet a little
smaller in relative terms (12.5% and 13.7% respectively). The contribution of the policy
effect is considerably larger for elderly poverty, both in absolute terms (6.8 and 6 points
respectively) and relative terms (48.9% and 54.5% respectively). That is, around half of
the country difference in elderly poverty is explained by the greater redistribution operated
in Ecuador in favor of this group. It is worth reemphasizing that contributory pensions are
not simulated in our models, therefore, the effect of the Ecuadorean tax-benefit system on
Colombian elderly poverty can most likely be attributed to the effect of the Human Develop-
ment Transfer, which would offer a more generous social assistance benefit for the elderly
not affiliated to social security in Colombia. The contribution of specific tax-benefit com-
ponents to income inequality and poverty for our baseline and counterfactual scenarios is
discussed in detail in the next section.
4.3 Marginal contributions of tax-benefit components
The effect of particular tax-benefit instruments (social assistance, income tax and SICs)
on income inequality and poverty is presented for each of our counterfactual scenarios in
Table 5. For social assistance, taxes and SICs respectively, we calculate their marginal con-
tribution to decreasing disposable income inequality/poverty (compared to market income
inequality) as follows: we take the difference between inequality/poverty of disposable
income and inequality/poverty of income before social assistance is added or before
income/SICs are withdrawn. For instance, in the first panel showing the marginal contri-
bution to Gini coefficient reduction, we can read in the following in the ‘DPI minus social
assistance’ row: in our baseline scenario for Ecuador (column 0), social assistance benefits
decrease income inequality by 1.4 points, which is obtained from the difference between the
Gini coefficient of disposable income (46.2) and the Gini coefficient of disposable income
excluding social assistance benefits (47.6). Social assistance also contributes the most to
inequality reduction in the Colombian baseline (column 4) with a reduction of 1.1 points in
the Gini coefficient. Our swapping exercise shows that applied to the Colombian population,
the Ecuadorean social assistance benefit would achieve the largest reduction in inequality
(column 3), with a difference of 1.8 points in the Gini coefficient. In contrast, under the
counterfactual where the Colombian tax-benefit system is applied to Ecuador (column 4),
social assistance would decrease inequality by only 0.8 points.
The contribution of personal income tax and SICs to inequality reduction is also larger
in Ecuador (column 0) compared to Colombia (column 4). Personal income tax reduces
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Table 5 Effect of tax-benefit components on poverty and inequality
Data country: EC EC CO EC CO
Uprated: Yes Yes
Policy country: EC EC EC CO CO
Uprated: Yes Yes
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Gini coefficient
DPI minus social assistance −1.4 −1.4 −1.8 −0.8 −1.1
DPI plus income tax −1.1 −1.1 −1.3 −0.9 −0.7
DPI plus SICs −1.3 −1.3 −1.1 0.0 −0.4
 Poverty headcount
DPI minus social assistance −2.6 −2.6 −2.4 −1.3 −1.1
DPI plus income tax 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2
DPI plus SICs 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.8
 Child poverty headcount
DPI minus social assistance −2.6 −2.6 −2.3 −1.5 −1.2
DPI plus income tax 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2
DPI plus SICs 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.9
 Elderly poverty headcount
DPI minus social assistance −8.2 −8.2 −7.3 −2.9 −2.9
DPI plus income tax 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3
DPI plus SICs 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.7
Note: EC: Ecuador; CO: Colombia. DPI= Disposable Income. Policy year 2014
Source: ECUAMOD version 1.0 and COLMOD version 1.0
income inequality by 1.1 points in the Ecuadorian baseline, whereas it account for 0.7 points
reduction in the Colombian baseline. Under the counterfactual case of the Ecuadorean
(Colombian) system applied to the Colombian (Ecuadorean) population, the marginal con-
tribution of income tax increases (decreases) to 1.3 (0.9) points. Finally, SICs have only a
minor effect on inequality in Colombia (column 4) and the same holds when the Colom-
bian system is applied to Ecuador (column 3). This could be linked to the existence of floor
payments in SICs under the Colombian system, which affects individuals at the lower end
of the income distribution as observed in Fig. 1 above.
In terms of poverty reduction, social assistance benefits play an essential role. Income
tax and SICs tend to increase absolute poverty (positive sign of their marginal contribu-
tions), as they are paid by everyone including the poor – this is especially the case of
SICs in Colombia, which is consistent with Fig. 1. Their effect remains small nevertheless.
The marginal contribution of social assistance reduces overall poverty by 2.6 points in the
Ecuadorean baseline (column 0) compared to 1.1 points in Colombia (column 4). These
differences are reflected in the contribution of social assistance under our counterfactual
swapping scenarios. The marginal contribution of social assistance doubles (reduces by half)
under the counterfactual where the Ecuadorean (Colombian) system is applied to Colombia
(Ecuador). In terms of child poverty, the marginal effect of tax-benefit components on is
very similar in magnitude to that of the whole population.
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The major role played by social assistance benefits in Ecuador is observed in terms
of their contribution to poverty reduction among the elderly. Social assistance benefits in
Ecuador (column 0) reduce poverty in this group by 8.2 points, whereas their marginal
contribution is 2.9 points in Colombia (column 4). Our decomposition results in the pre-
vious section showed that the poverty headcount among the elderly would drop by 6.6
points in Colombia if the Ecuadorean tax-benefit system would be applied to its popula-
tion. As previously mentioned, such effect could be attributed to the more generous social
assistance benefits in Ecuador, given that contributory pensions are not simulated in our
models. Table 5 confirms these results. In the case the Ecuadorean system would be applied
to Colombia (column 2), the marginal contribution of social assistance benefits to elderly
poverty reduction would increase substantially from 2.9 to 7.3 points, because of the more
generous benefit amount of the Human Development Transfer from Ecuador for old-age
individuals not covered by social security.
Our characterization may be sensitive to the path of the decomposition. To check this,
we alternatively assess the effect of tax-benefit components on income inequality/poverty
when starting from market income (i.e. when adding social assistance to or withdrawing
taxes/SICs from market income). Table A5 in the Online appendix presents the results of this
alternative calculation and shows that the results are broadly consistent. Social assistance
benefits play the biggest role in inequality and poverty reduction and particularly so under
the Ecuadorean baseline and in the counterfactual where the Ecuadorean system would be
applied to the Colombian population.
5 Conclusions
The decreasing trend in income inequality observed over the recent decades in Latin Amer-
ican countries has inspired numerous studies on the factors behind such improvement.
Lower wage inequality is the main driver behind the decline in household income inequal-
ity. However, as pointed by De la Torre et al. (2017) “the contribution of nonlabor income
cannot be disregarded as minor”. In fact, many countries in the region have made impor-
tant progress in reforming their tax-benefit systems to achieve larger redistribution, through
more progressive income taxation and higher cash transfers to vulnerable populations.
The present paper takes advantage of the recent development of harmonized tax-benefit
models for Ecuador and Colombia to provide one of the first comparative settings for
microsimulation in Latin American countries, and contributes to the recent literature on
the redistributive role of tax-benefit systems in Latin America in two main respects. First,
we use detailed legislation rules and information from household surveys to simulate tax-
benefit components that are not directly available in the household survey data and need
to be calculated in order to assess their effect on poverty and inequality. Second, we pro-
pose a decomposition approach based on counterfactual scenarios obtained by swapping
tax-benefit systems between Ecuador and Colombia in order to quantify the relative effect
of the tax-benefit policies in income inequality and poverty compared to all other effects,
including differences in the distribution of market incomes between the two countries.
Our results point to a modest but non-negligible redistributive role of tax-benefit systems
in Ecuador and Colombia, in line with previous studies. The Ecuadorean tax-benefit system
is more redistributive, and if applied to the Colombian population, would decrease income
inequality and poverty more than the Colombian system does. The poverty reducing effect
of the Ecuadorean tax-benefit system would be the largest for the elderly in Colombia.
Social assistance benefits in Ecuador play an important redistributive role and achieve a
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large reduction in income poverty. In particular, the reduction of poverty among the elderly
under the counterfactual scenario where the Ecuadorean system is applied to the Colombian
population is related to the Human Development Transfer from Ecuador, which provides a
more generous social assistance benefit for the elderly not protected by social security.
From a policy perspective, our paper stresses the importance of developing harmonized
microsimulation models for Latin American countries to learn from other countries in
designing tax-benefit systems, and to promote further developments of socio-fiscal systems
in countries in the region. Expanding the development of microsimulation models to other
countries in the region would, for instance, allow us to quantify the extent to which coun-
tries with similar levels of market income inequality diverge in terms of redistribution. At
the regional level, previous research has shown that the decline in income inequality has
gone hand-in-hand with an increase in income tax revenue and public spending per capita.
It would be interesting to analyze whether the drop in income inequality has been more
marked in countries where social benefit and/or tax have progressed the most.
The role of indirect taxes and in-kind benefits was not considered in our analysis. The
overall picture of our results should, however, not be affected if these components were
included. On the one hand, a recent study by Rojas Ba´ez (2017) shows that indirect taxes
are fairly proportional with respect to disposable income in Ecuador but have a more regres-
sive nature in Colombia. The Ecuadorean tax-benefit system would therefore be even more
redistributive if applied to the Colombian population when VAT is taken into account. On
the other hand, social spending in education and health are of broadly similar size in the two
countries, representing around 8.7% of GDP in Ecuador and 9.5% in Colombia. Assess-
ing the redistributive effect of in-kind benefits on income redistribution is, however, a very
complex task as it requires estimating the monetary value of public services and assigning it
to particular individuals in the data. The effect of in-kind benefits on income redistribution
would necessarily be affected by the assumptions made about individuals benefiting from
public services.
Several extensions or improvements could be considered for future research. For
instance, our paper captures only the direct effect of swapping tax-benefit rules in the
decomposition. Potential behavioral responses or general equilibrium effects of applying
the tax-benefit system of another country could be considered in the future. For the purpose
of this analysis, we also assumed zero evasion of personal income tax. As such, our results
are interpreted as capturing the intended effect of personal income tax, which appeared to
be very small. Potential reactions in terms of tax-evasion could also be considered when the
system of one country is applied to the population of another. However, identifying the indi-
viduals most likely to evade taxes in a comparative setting is a challenging task. The above
mentioned issues require careful consideration and represent promising subjects for future
research.
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